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Abstract 
 
Despite a surging literature in investigating different impacts of corruption and/or anti-
corruption from firms’ perspective, it is still unclear whether and how corruption and/or 
anti-corruption affect households’ borrowing behaviour. In this paper, we focus on a 
Chinese online peer-to-peer lending market and analyse the impact of the recent 
China’s anti-corruption campaign on households’ borrowing costs. We employ a 
Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation strategy and investigate three exogenous 
shocks regarding the movement: 1) the 2012 Eight Point Policy announcement; 2) 
multiple rounds of the Central Inspection Team Campaigns during 2013 and 2014; 3) 
and the anti-corruption rules for military-related personnel in early 2015. Our results 
show that equilibrium interest rates of borrowers pertaining to Non-SOEs dropped 
significantly comparing to that of SOEs and/or government agencies in the wake of the 
first two events. Borrowers affiliating with military-related institutions were also 
worsened after the military specific anti-corruption campaign. Finally, we examine the 
two possible economic channels. Suggestive evidences show that both a rise of interest 
risk premium for SOEs borrowers and a better outlook of Non-SOEs after the anti-
corruption reform could account for the observed favour of the borrowing costs towards 
Non-SOEs borrowers. These findings are consistent with previous studies regarding the 
effects of anti-corruptions from firms’ aspects such as Lin et al., (2016) and Griffin et 
al., (2016). This study also complements the P2P literature by demonstrating the 
importance of online borrowers’ occupations / job affiliations. 
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I. Introduction 
It has been widely recognized that corruption is pernicious for various economic 
activities. Macroeconomic growth is found to be retarded and economic resources could 
also be misallocated (Shleifer & Vishny 1993, Mauro 1995). At the corporate level, 
firms’ growth is also negatively affected (Fisman & Svensson, 2007). Corruption not 
only increases the cost of credit and credit risks (Butler et al., 2009), but also jeopardizes 
ﬁrms’ leverage and liquidity holdings (Kong et al., 2017; Smith, 2016). Firms’ credits 
would be reallocated more inefficiently, and even corporate innovation activities could 
be suppressed (Ellis et al., 2017; Giannetti et al., 2017; Li et al., 2017). Corruption is 
also destructive for households, partly due to a higher direct bureaucratic and bribery 
costs, or even opportunity cost from imprisonment (Hunt & Laszlo, 2005; Olken, 2006; 
Reinikka & Svensson, 2004). Households’ risky investment activities could also be 
damped due to the corrupted institutions (Bu et al., 2019).  
One potential identification challenge in establishing the casual relationship 
between corruption and other economic variables is the endogeneity, which boosts a 
growing literature utilizing the recent China’s anti-corruption movement as a quasi-
natural experiment. For instances, Griffin et al. (2016) shows the anticorruption 
campaign initiated in December 2012 was effective in reducing the corruptions in China. 
Ke et al. (2016) and Lin et al. (2016) studied the market reaction around the 
announcement of the Eight-Point Policy and the heterogeneous reactions made by state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs). In terms of 
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real effects, a more positive information release by Non-SOEs was found relative to 
that of SOEs (Cao et al., 2018) and Non-SOEs’ innovation activities were also 
promoted (Gan & Xu, 2019). Moreover, the campaign also increases the labour 
intensity adopted by firms, as argued by Qian (2019). Despite the huge literature 
relating the China’s anti-corruption movement and resulting firms’ performance, there 
is very few studies focusing on the impact from households’ perspective, except the 
very recent work by Agarwal et al. (2018) and Bu et al. (2019). 
This article aims to contribute this literature by exploring the impact of the anti-
corruption campaign on households’ Fintech financing activities. Specifically, we pay 
particular interests in the impacts on the equilibrium loan interest rate, one of the key 
variables that proxies the borrowing cost. We analyze a transaction-level data recorded 
by one of the largest online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending market in China. Our analysis 
also includes some important borrowers’ attributes such as occupations and job 
affiliations. Our Difference-in-Differences (DID) identification strategy relies on three 
exogenous shocks regarding the campaign: the 2012 Eight Point Policy announcement, 
multiple rounds of the Central Inspection Team Campaigns during 2013 and 2014 and 
the anti-corruption rules for military-related personnel in early 2015. Besides the timing 
differences, these shocks also take the advantage of variations at both regional and 
occupation/job affiliation level. In particular, we investigate the relative change in 
borrowing costs of employees from Non-SOEs or military related institutions after the 
shocks. 
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Our results show that equilibrium interest rates of borrowers pertaining to Non-
SOEs dropped significantly comparing to that of SOEs and/or government agencies in 
the wake of both the Eight-Point Policy announcement and the Central Inspection Team 
Campaigns. In addition, it is found that borrowing costs for people working for 
military-related institutions were also worsened relative to their SOEs counterparties 
after the military specific anti-corruption campaign. Interestingly, their costs were 
mostly deteriorated when they intend to finance relatively risky projects. 
We then explore the potential mechanisms regarding our baseline results. The 
observed reduction of Non-SOEs borrowers’ loan interest rates could possibly be 
explained by two economic channels. The first reason relates a flourishing prospectus 
of the Non-SOEs. It is found that Non-SOEs benefited more from the campaign and the 
effects were stronger in provinces with more established market institutions (Lin et al., 
2018). Therefore, the reduction of borrowing costs could because of the perceived 
advance of Non-SOEs’ total factor productivities (TFPs) or future profitability. 
Employees from the Non-SOEs could thus gain advantages in the P2P lending market. 
The second explanation concerns with the risk premium due to the anti-corruption 
movement, especially for borrowers from the SOEs or government agencies that the 
policies target on. The escalating risk could therefore translate to a higher equilibrium 
interest. 
 We empirically test these hypotheses using a Triple Difference-in-Differences 
(Triple DID) estimation. For the first explanation, we follow Lin et al. (2018) and 
incorporate the province-level marketization index prepared by National Economic 
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Research Institution (NERI), which measures provincial differences of their market 
liberalization progresses (Fan et al., 2011). Borrowing costs of individuals from Non-
SOEs locating in more liberalized provinces were abated saliently after both the Eight 
Point policy event and the the Central Inspection Team Campaigns event. For the 
second reasoning, we use borrowers’ age and salary level as proxy variables for their 
job seniorities. Consistent with the hypothesis, our results suggest that aging or higher 
salary level borrowers from the SOEs and/or government agencies were at significant 
disadvantage following the two aforementioned events. Thus, we both identify and 
confirm the two possible hypotheses through these testable implications. It should be 
worth noted that the previous finding regarding the exacerbated interest rates for 
individuals at military-related institutions after the third military specific anti-
corruption campaign could be largely attributed to the elevated risk premium, as we 
intentionally excludes the Non-SOEs’ employees from our DID analysis. 
 Furthermore, corruption might also influence households through direct or indirect 
channels (Hunt & Laszlo, 2005; Olken, 2006; Reinikka & Svensson, 2004; Bu et al, 
2019). As a result, the anti-corruption campaign could incline to those ﬁnancially 
constrained households facing larger direct corruption costs. Indeed, we found 
consistent evidence that Non-SOEs peers with mortgage enjoyed a more favored curtail 
in their borrowing interest rates. 
 Though we employ a shock-based analysis to account for the potential endogeneity, 
further comments regarding the repeated cross-sectional nature of the P2P lending data 
is still valid, as we still suffer from the omitted variable bias (OVB) by not controlling 
all the possible unobserved personal characteristics. To further alleviate this 
endogeneity concern, we carry a serious of robustness checking estimations by adding 
borrower’s fixed effect. By focus on the same person who participated in the Fintech 
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lending market both before and after, our baseline conclusions remain unchanged for 
all the three events. This suggest that our previous results are not driven by the 
unobserved time-invariant personal characteristics. 
 Our work relates and contributes to the following two strands of literature. The 
existing literature on anti-corruption exclusive investigate firms’ assorted behaviours 
(Griffin et al. 2016, Ke et al. 2016, Lin et al. 2016, Cao et al. 2018, Gan & Xu 2019, 
Qian 2019), with very few exceptions includes households’ reactions such as Bu et al. 
(2019) and Agarwal et al. (2018). Our work closely relates to Bu et al. (2019), which 
also studies the impact of on household finance. It is worth noting that our paper differs 
from their work in several aspects. First, we mainly focus on borrowing costs while 
existing studies including Bu et al. (2019) concentrate on loan amounts. Second, our 
transactional level data is relatively high (daily) frequency, which could better pinpoint 
the announcement date while Bu et al. (2019) uses the three waves of repeated cross-
section household survey data in 2011, 2013 and 2015. Third, we look at three 
exogenous shocks relating to the anti-corruption campaign, while they only investigate 
the Central Inspection Team Campaigns due to their constraint in term of the data 
frequency. 
While the existing crowdfunding literature primarily focus on personal 
characteristics (Lin & Viswanathan, 2015), our work extends it by analysing the far-
reaching anti-corruption political policy. Pioneer work establishing the relationship 
between public policy and P2P market is Li et. al (2018), which finds a negative causal 
linkage between general policy uncertainty index and P2P funding in the U.S. Instead, 
we shed light on the potential gains and losses for borrowers from different job 
affiliations through three specific policy shocks. Our study also has practical 
 6 
significance in providing some empirical evidences how China’s anti-corruption 
policies affect household credit access through a Fintech lending market. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the 
institutional backgrounds of the three events relating to China’s anti-corruption 
campaign that we investigated in the remaining sections. Section III describes the data 
source and reports some key summary statistics. Section IV elaborates the identification 
strategies and presents the corresponding empirical results. Section V shows the 
robustness checking results and Section VI concludes. 
II. Background of research 
Background and Significance of the Anti-corruption Campaign in China  
Cracking down on corruptions in China has gradually become the “New Normal” ever 
since the conclusion of the Party’s 18th National Congress on November 14, 2012. 
Upon taking office, President Xi Jinping launched a far-reaching anti-corruption 
campaign expeditiously. It is widely regarded as targeting "tigers and flies", quoted 
from the Guardian1. This is also one the largest anti-corruption movement in the history 
of Communist in China, targeting the rampant graft in Chinese officialdom.  
This high-profile campaign first came from an official report submitted to the 18th 
National Congress by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) on 
November 20, 2012. The report sets corruptions as the one of the major political risks 
and advocates for an immediate fighting against corruptions. Subsequently, on 
                                                 
1
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/22/xi-jinping-tigers-flies-corruption 
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November 30, 2012, Mr. Wang Qishan, the newly appointed Secretary of the CCDI, 
seek for advices on how to build a clean government2 and fight against corruption when 
presiding over a symposium of experts and scholars.  
The Eight-Point Policy (八项主义) Announcement in 2012 
The Central Politburo of the Communist Party of China further pushed forward the 
movement by announcing the Eight-Point Policy on December 4, 2012, which was 
officially announced only nineteen days after President Xi’s inauguration. The Policy, 
which is considered as a major anti-corruption reform, categorically underscores that 
leading cadres, especially those senior ones, must cut down on their extravagant work 
styles. In addition, corruptions including red tapes shall also be severely punished. 
These restrictions aim at disciplining party members and making them to be more 
"closer to the public". According to official propaganda, the Policy calls for party 
members and officials to 'do real work and say real things’ and understand the practical 
situations “on the ground”.  It seeks to tackle the culture of privilege that permeates 
the Chinese officialdom during the rule of his predecessors. Admittedly, a policy 
proclaimed during a political transition period normally raises less attention from the 
public due to the consideration of political repression or public image (Chen et al., 
2018). Yet, the Eight-Point Policy, proposed within an unprecedented short period of 
                                                 
2
 The word “clean government” is officially mentioned by the Chinese government. (See 
http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2010-12/29/content_1775353_2.htm) 
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time, is still a vital signal sent to government officers as well as to the public. It is thus 
a well-accepted anti-corruption policy shock in the related literature. (Ding, et al., 2017) 
The Policy addressed some detailed and specific refrains to prevent transfers of 
hidden interests or other suspicious behaviours. It is widely considered as first official 
policy relating to the anti-corruption agenda. (Chen et al., 2018) The more detailed 
description of the Policy is briefly summarized and translated in Appendix II 
Multiple Rounds of Central Inspection Team Campaigns (CITC) (中央巡查组) 
To effectively implement the Eight-Point Policy and eliminate corruptions on a national 
scale, the CCDI further introduced the Central Inspection Team Campaigns (CITC) in 
the middle of 2013. The CITC is mainly tasked with enforcing the Policy and combating 
the malfeasance. It conducts investigations covering provincial-level regions on a 
rolling basis through multiple rounds. Targeting at "tigers" and "flies", one of the 
crucial mission of Central Inspection Team (CIT) was to find out whether the leading 
cadres in the province inspected were involved in illegal monetary transactions, or the 
possible misuse of power for private interests, briberies, and other violations of 
discipline and law. If any corruption is discovered, inspectors shall report it to the CIT. 
The first round of the CIT investigation, which involves a total of six provinces 
(Chongqing, Guizhou, Hubei, Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi), was formally announced on 
May 17th, 2013.  
The team have been linked to innovative approaches and other breakthroughs in 
Party governance, by which conducted investigations at the government agencies and 
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some major state-owned enterprises (SOEs) one-at-a-time in those provinces. The CIT 
carried multiple rounds of inspection during 2013 and 2014. The announcement time 
of the inspection dates varied from provinces. Detailed information of announcement 
dates and province involved is in summarized in the literature such as Ding, et al. (2017) 
and Bu, et al. (2019). The relevant information is reproduced in Appendix III. 
Anti-Corruption Rules for Military Related Personnel 
On January 18, 2015, the People's Liberation Army Daily (解放军报)3 directly quoted 
the talk of President Xi Jinping during an important army meeting, where President Xi 
underlined the importance of the anti-corruption campaign at the military level. 
According to his talk, “the income of military officials must solely depend on their 
salaries. There is absolutely no extra room for the so-called ‘grey income’ or any other 
forms of illegal gains. Otherwise, the officers will be investigated and punished”. 
Official propaganda such as CPC News and People’s Daily quickly republished it on 
January 19, 2015.4 
This talk thus clearly sent a tenacious anti-corruption signal specifically to the 
military related personnel. It became even more formal and explicit soon after two 
months. The China PLA General Political Department (人民解放军总参谋部), on 
March 17, 2015, announced an official policy titled as Several Provisions on 
                                                 
3
 The People's Liberation Army Daily is the official newspaper of the Chinese People's Liberation 
Army (PLA). 
4
 See http://cpc.people.com.cn/pinglun/n/2015/0119/c241220-26411109.html and 
http://ln.people.com.cn/n/2015/0118/c353958-23593695.html for details 
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Standardizing the Welfare and Subsidies of Military Officers (关于规范完善军队人员
有关福利待遇的若干规定)5. According to Xinhua News, this policy set specific rules 
and limits for subsidies at all levels of the military officials, which aims to prevent them 
from the Four Winds problem (四风问题)6. According to People's Daily, a total of 33 
high-ranking military officials were under investigations and fell into detentions during 
the first three months of 2015.7  
III. Data and Summary Statistics 
3.1 Data resource description 
The empirical analysis is based on the household-level data collected from Renrendai,  
one of the oldest and largest online peer-to-peer (P2P) platforms in China. Renrendai 
covers more than 2,000 regions in 31 provinces in China since its establishment in 
October 2010. By the end of the second quarter of 2019, the total number of borrowers 
registered at Renrendai is approximately 1.17 million, and the total transaction volume 
exceeds 86.1 billion RMB. Besides, the average loan amount of a loan is 73,000 RMB 
with an average maturity period 31 months.  
Renrendai establishes a comprehensive information disclosure system, which 
makes loan information available to investors on its official website. To initiate a loan 
request, a borrower needs to submit an application form, filling in some loan-related 
                                                 
5
 http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-03/17/content_6401409.htm 
6
 Four Winds problem refers to formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and extravagance. See 
http://www.xinhuanet.com//mil/2015-03/18/c_127592083.html for details 
7
 https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1325147 
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information such as the amount, maturity periods and the promised interest rate. In 
addition, he or she could voluntarily disclose information in order to increase his or her 
funding probability as well as to enjoy a potential lower borrowing cost. Borrowers’ 
soft and hard information typically includes gender, marital status, age, education level, 
salary level, house or car ownership, house or car mortgage, etc. Furthermore, 
borrowers could also choose to disclose their job-related information such as employers’ 
names and industries, nature of corporations as well as their job titles.  
Renrendai scrutinizes all loan applications and the credentials (certifications) 
provided by borrowers. The platform then assigns a certain credit limit to the borrowers 
passing Renrendai’s internal eligibility tests. The platform assigns a credit grade to each 
deal based on the certified information provided by borrowers as well as their historical 
borrowing records. The credit grade ranges from AA to HR (six grades in total, AA, A, 
B, C, D, E, HR). Importantly, the credit grade that observed by the lenders, decides the 
range of the borrowing interest rate for the loan. Thus, borrowers with higher credit 
grades shall more likely to be funded and with a relatively lower borrowing cost. 
Notably, borrowers could choose a particular interest rate within the given range.  
Upon approval, borrowers could initiate a loan request and set at a specific amount, 
maturity period and the interest rate. The minimum amount of a crowdfunding is 100 
RMB and is capped by the credit amount rationed. Each loan proposal is posted online 
up to seven days and is closed so long as target funding amount is reached. As a result, 
the duration of the closure and the number of investors suggest the speed and the 
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attractiveness of a loan to its lenders. If borrowers fail to raise the desired amount within 
seven days, the loan proposal would be no longer valid. Under such scenario, it is 
considered as unsuccessful and the funding already raised shall be returned to lenders 
with certain interests to compensate the opportunity costs. 
Borrowers are required to be repay their loans at a monthly basis. As it can be seen 
clearly, loan’s status is considered as “default” if one or more instalments are overdue 
for more than thirty days. Conversely, “closed” and “in progress” statuses refer to the 
case that loans are not default. 
3.2 Summary Statistics 
Our sample consists of all of P2P funded loans from October 2010 to December 2015, 
which covers the duration of the three major anti-corruption campaign shocks. The P2P 
sample includes funded borrowers’ borrowing interests, loan amount as well as their 
individual characteristics. To summarize, our sample includes 216,886 households, of 
which 28,362 government employees and 188,524 non-government employees. 49,049 
borrowers work in both government and state-own enterprises and 167,837 otherwise.  
The details of the characteristics of the P2P borrowers from the sample could be 
shown in Table 1. We create a Non_Gov dummy equalling one if a borrower works for 
government agencies and zero otherwise. Non_SOE is defined as a dummy variable, 
which takes the value of one if a borrower works for state-owned companies and zero 
otherwise. We also construct Non-Army as an indicator variable to measure whether the 
borrower works for military sectors among government agencies and SOEs, which 
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equals to one when a household works in military sectors. Loan is a dummy variable 
with one having house loan or car loan and zero otherwise. Marketization is the 
province-level Marketization Index produced by the National Economic Research 
Institute (NERI) (Fan et al., 2011), which is retrieved from official statistics and 
enterprise and household surveys. Ranging from zero to ten in the base year 2001, the 
index represents the private sector shares of output, investment and employment, price 
controls and trade barriers, liberalized factor of markets, and the legal environment.  
To be addressed, the Non-government houseowners’ average borrowing interests 
(12.108%) has not significant difference with the interest rate of the government 
houseowners (12.107%), which is the same for Non-SOE borrowers (12.106%) and 
SOE borrowers (12.111%), and Non-military SOE borrowers (12.111%) and military 
borrowers (12.106%). Meanwhile, the average loan size for borrowers who work for 
Non-government (60088.1RMB), Non-SOE (59808.04RMB) are significantly lower 
than those of controlled houseowners (66302.74 and 64639.97), respectively. While 
Non-military SOE household borrows significantly more (64639.97 versus 59808 
RMB).  
IV．Estimation Strategies and Results 
To analyse the how this anti-corruption campaign affects P2P borrowing activities, we 
first plot the evolution of household borrowing costs in the Non-government agencies 
employees and the others, as well as Non-SOE employees and the others. We estimate 
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the common trend assumptions for one-year pre-policy trend (January-December, 2012) 
in the following regression to examine whether DD is an applicable approach: 
(1) 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 
In the regressions, i, t are borrower and month indices, correspondingly. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 
indicates the P2P funded interest rate. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 indicates monthly trends during 
the study. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑟  is a dummy variable with one working for Non-government 
agencies while zero otherwise, or a dummy variable with one working for Non-SOE 
while zero otherwise . 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 represents a full set of household characteristics and city 
fixed effects with standard error clustered at the city level to account for the serial 
correlation. From Table 2, we could conclude that the common trend assumption is 
valid since all of the interaction terms, 𝛽3 , are insignificant. A similar trend for 
borrowing interests before the announcement of the 2012 Eight Point Policy in 
December 24, 2012 is confirmed. 
4.12 DD Analysis 
Based on the common trend assumption, we could further test the effect of the 2012 
Eight Point Policy on the household with different types of job affiliation (office type) 
through the following DD model: 
(2)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 
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(3)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 
where 𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖  is an indicator equal to one if the borrower works for Non-
government agencies and zero otherwise. 𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑖 is an indicator equal to one if 
the borrower works for Non-SOEs and zero otherwise. 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 is an indicator equal to 
1 when house borrowing is made after the policy shock, December 24, 2012, and zero 
otherwise. 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 represents a full set of household characteristics, city, and month times 
year fixed effects, with two-way standard error clustered at both city and office type 
level. Our coefficient of interest β3 captures the effects of the anti-corruption policy 
reform on borrowers working for Non-SOE firms. The time duration of research sample 
in this test ranges from October 2010 to December 2013. 
From DD results shown in Table 3, we could identify that the P2P borrowing 
interest rates for treated Non-government and Non-SOE employees drop more 
significantly rather than those of control groups after the announcement of the 2012 
Eight Point Policy. This outcome means that treated household tends to achieve a lower 
borrowing costs to crowdfund in the P2P platform.  
4.12 DDD Analysis  
In order to identify the potential mechanism of the main result and estimate the effect 
of heterogeneity of the household characteristics, financially constrains, and province 
marketizations on the variation of household responses in the P2P lending market, DDD 
frameworks are further conducted as follow:  
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(4)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖+ 𝛽4 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 
(5)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1 𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 ∗  𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖+ 𝛽2 𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽4 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 
(6)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1  𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 ∗  𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖+ 𝛽2𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 
Where 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖  is a dummy variable and equals to 1 if borrower i has either 
house mortgage and 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  is the province-level Marketization Index 
produced by the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) (Fan et al., 2011). 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠  is the household characteristics like age. The definitions of other 
variables are the same as those stated before.  
 From Table 4, our results that the DDD interaction term for interest on age is 
significantly negative, which shows that SOE households with elder age could 
experience a greater increase of interest rates compared with Non-SOE households. 
This echoes our mechanisms the relatively higher borrowing costs for SOE households 
is due to their job and income security concerns since the anti-corruption campaign will 
jeopardize their current work status. Meanwhile, the employees with higher age in the 
SOE generally represents a higher rank in government or SOE since the anti-corruption 
campaign organically targeted on corrupted high rank government employees. 
Therefore, a greater increase borrowing costs for the elder age could confirm that one 
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possible economic mechanism for the increasing borrowing costs for SOEs would be 
the escalating risk premium.   
DDD results from Table 4 also show that Non-SOE households located at the 
province with higher marketization will experience a sharper decrease of interest rates 
with compared to SOE households. This outcome responds to another channel of the 
main results that Non_SOE households benefit more due to the perceived increase of 
Non-SOEs’ total factor productivities or future profitability, which echoes the research 
finding from Lin et al (2018). Another finding from DDD estimation is that Non-SOE 
households with more financial constraints will experience a deeper decrease of interest 
rates with compared to SOE households. This not only stands for the channel of the 
main results that Non-SOEs peers could gain benefits through reducing the direct 
corruption costs, so that Non-SOEs with mortgage enjoyed a more favoured curtail in 
their borrowing interest rates. This channel is supported by various literatures (Hunt & 
Laszlo, 2005; Olken, 2006; Reinikka & Svensson, 2004; Bu et al, 2019). This finding 
also provides evidences to the findings from Bu et al (2019) that Non-SOEs are more 
inclined to surge their investment in financial market and increases their financial 
leverage after the anti-corruption campaign.  
4.2 The Impact of the Central Inspection Team Campaigns (CITC) on Household 
Borrowing Costs 
4.21 Parallel trend tests 
We conduct tests of the parallel trend to ensure that treated and control household 
employees did not exhibit significant differences in borrowing costs and other personal 
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characteristics before the anti-corruption campaign (November, 2012 to April, 2013) in 
the following regression, since the first the Central Inspection Team Campaigns was 
launched on May, 17, 2013. We select half year pre-period to avoid the time overlap 
with the previous shock.    
(7) 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 
The regression setting follows the previous parallel test from equation (7). From 
Table 5, we could conclude that the common trend assumption is valid, and a similar 
trend is shown for borrowing interests before the announcement of the Central 
Inspection Team Campaigns from May 2013 to July of 2014. 
4.22 DD Analysis 
Based on the common trend assumption, we could further test the effect of the Central 
Inspection Team Campaigns on the household with different types of job affiliations 
(office type) through the following DD model: 
(8)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 
Where 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable and equals one when the central inspection 
team visited borrower i’s province at time t and zero otherwise. The timeline of the visit 
could be found in Appendix II. Other variables are similarly defined as those in the 
equation 6. The research sample from October 2010 to December 2015 is selected for 
the estimation. 
From DD results shown in Table 6, we could further identify that the treated Non-
government and Non-SOE employee P2P borrowing interest rates drop more 
significantly rather than those of control groups after the visit of central inspection team. 
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This outcome shows that Non-government and Non-SOE employee household could 
achieve a lower borrowing costs to crowdfund in the P2P platform. 
4.23 DDD Analysis  
To confirm the potential mechanism of the main result and estimate effect of 
heterogeneity of the household characteristics, financially constrains, and province 
marketizations on the variation of household responses in the P2P lending market, a 
similar set of DDD frameworks for the second shock are conducted as follow:  
(9)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖+ 𝛽2𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 
(10)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1 𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 ∗  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖+ 𝛽2 𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖∗  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽43 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 
(11)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1  ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖+ 𝛽2𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 
Where 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠  is the household characteristics including age and salary. 
Other variables are similarly defined as those in the equation (9).  
From Table 7, our finding parallels with the DDD results that SOE households with 
elder age could experience a greater increase of interest rates compared with Non-SOE 
households and Non-SOE households with more financial constraints and located at the 
province with higher marketization will experience a stronger decrease of interest rates 
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with compared to the SOE household. This result further confirms the two possible 
mechanisms of the main result as mentioned above. An additional finding that support 
the risk premium channel is that SOE households with higher salary could experience 
a greater increase of interest rates since SOE employees with higher salary implying 
their higher rank in the government or SOE which face more exposures to the job-
related and income-related risks during the Central Inspection Team Campaigns. 
4.3 The Impact of the Announcement of Anti-corruption Rules for Military-
related personnel on Household Borrowing Costs 
4.31 DD Analysis 
Since the monthly data is limited for the shock of military anti- corruption campaign, 
we skip the common trend test and directly test the shock on the household with 
different types if job affiliation through the following DD model: 
(12)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖  is an indicator equals to one when house borrowing is made after the 
announcement of the military anti-corruption campaign on January 18, 2015, and zero 
otherwise. 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 is an indicator equals to one when household works at Non-military 
government agencies and SOEs while zero when household serves at military sectors. 
The variables are similarly defined as those in the equation (12). The research sample 
from January 2013 to December 2015 has been used for the estimation. 
From DD results shown in Table 8, we identify that Non-military government 
agencies and SOEs employees’ P2P borrowing interest rates drop more significantly 
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rather than military borrowers after the exogenous shock. This outcome confirms the 
previous conclusions that even for the sub sample of government and SOE households, 
anti-corruption campaign could let relatively unaffected group to achieve a lower 
borrowing costs to crowdfund in the P2P platform. 
4.33 DDD Analysis  
As the military anti-graft campaign in 2015 particularly target on the investment and 
business activities from military employees, a DDD frameworks are further conducted 
as follow to test the related heterogenous effect.   
(13)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 ∗ 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖∗ 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 
Where 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 indicates the purpose of the household borrowing for investment or 
entrepreneur activities. 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 is an indicator equal to one when house borrowing is 
made after the policy shock, January 18, 2015, and zero otherwise. Other variables are 
similarly defined as those in the equation (13). From Table 8, we find that investment 
or entrepreneur activities for Non-military government agencies and SOEs employees 
after the shock is more supported in P2P market which echoes the previous finding that 
non affected peers could gain benefits through reducing the direct corruption costs and 
are more inclined to surge their investment in financial market and increases their 
financial leverage after the anti-corruption campaign, as they could enjoy a more 
favoured curtail in their borrowing interest rates. 
6. Robustness Test 
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Although we apply DID estimation based on three exogenous shocks to account for the 
potential endogeneity, a concern that is related to the repeated cross-sectional nature of 
the P2P lending data is still valid, since we still suffer from the omitted variable bias 
from various possible unobserved personal characteristics. Therefore, we carry a 
serious of robustness checking estimations by adding borrower’s fixed effect to 
alleviate the endogeneity consideration, as shown in the following regression model. 
The borrower’s fixed effect targets on the same person who participated in the P2P 
lending market both before and after the shocks. 
(14)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 
(15)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 
(16)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑦𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑦𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 
For the equation (16), 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is P2P funded interest. 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 is an indicator equal 
to one if the borrower works for Non-government agencies or Non-SOEs and zero 
otherwise. 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 is an indicator equal to one when house borrowing is made after the 
policy shock, December 24, 2012, and zero otherwise. 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 represents borrower and 
month times year fixed effects, with two-way standard error clustered at both borrower 
and office type level. For the equation (16), 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable and 
equals one when the central inspection team visited borrower i’s province at time t and 
zero otherwise. Other variables and sets are similarly defined as those in the equation 
(16). For the equation (16), 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 is an indicator equal to one when house borrowing 
is made after the announcement of the military anti-corruption campaign on January 18, 
2015, and zero otherwise. 𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑦𝑡  is an indicator equal to 0 for non-military 
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government agencies and SOEs employees and one for employees who serve in the 
military sector. Other variables and sets follow those in the equation (16).  
The robustness test result from Table 9 confirms that our main conclusions remain 
unchanged for all the three events. This suggest that our previous results are not driven 
by the unobserved time-invariant personal characteristics. 
6. Conclusion 
Our research analyzes the effect of three exogenous events from China anti-corruption 
campaigns on household borrowers from one of the largest online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) 
lending market in China. Our analysis also includes some important borrowers’ 
attributes including occupations and job affiliations. The three exogenous shocks that 
our DID identification strategy relies on include the 2012 Eight Point Policy 
announcement, multiple rounds of the Central Inspection Team Campaigns during 2013 
and 2014 and the anti-corruption rules for military-related personnel in early 2015. 
Through the investigation of the relative changes in borrowing costs of employees from 
Non-SOEs or military related institutions after the shocks, our findings show that 
equilibrium borrowing costs pertaining to Non-SOEs dropped significantly comparing 
to that of SOEs and/or government agencies in the wake of both the Eight-Point Policy 
announcement and the Central Inspection Team Campaigns. Furthermore, borrowing 
costs for household who works for military-related institutions were also worsened 
relative to their government and SOEs counterparties after the military specific anti-
corruption campaign. Their costs were mostly deteriorated when they intend to finance 
relatively risky projects. 
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Based on the research finding, we explore two potential mechanisms to explain the 
reduction of Non-SOEs and Non-Government borrowers’ loan interest rates. These two 
explained channels include a thriving prospectus of the Non-SOEs and the growing risk 
premium of SOE and government borrowers due to the anti-corruption movement. Our 
triple DID estimation findings support these two channels. In the first channel, Non-
SOEs benefited more from the campaign with more perceived value from its total factor 
productivity or future profitability since the effects were stronger in provinces with 
more established market institutions. As a result, Non-SOEs could thus gain advantages 
in the P2P lending market. The second explanation focuses on the risk premium due to 
the anti-corruption movement, especially for borrowers from the SOEs or government 
agencies that the policies target on. The rising job and income risk could therefore 
translate to a higher borrowing cost. Borrowers’ age and salary level are applied as 
proxy variables for their job ranks. Consistent with the hypothesis, our results suggest 
that higher ranked borrowers from the SOEs and/or government agencies were at 
significant disadvantage following the first two events as these households have to take 
a higher risk premium. At last, a number of robustness checking estimations by adding 
borrower’s fixed effect in to the DID estimations are launched to alleviate the 
endogeneity consideration. The robustness test results echo our main research findings 
based on the three events. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics  
This table presents summary the number of samples, the mean and standard deviations for characteristics of funded loans, borrowers and cities of our sample (10 Oct 2010 and 
31 Dec 2015). Data on loans, borrowers is from Renrendai P2P platform. Marketization Index produced by the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) (Fan et al., 2011). 
are in brackets. For The definition of the variables refers to Appendix table. 
 Army Non_Army Gov Non_Gov SOE Non_SOE 
 mean sd N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd N 
loan amount 64639.97 
44197.5
4 49049 
5980
8.04 
48686
.86 
16783
7 
66302
.74 
46590
.45 
2836
2 
60088.
1 
47870
.89 
18852
4 
64639
.97 
4419
7.54 49049 59808.04 
48686.
86 167837 
interest rate 12.111 1.226 49049 12.106 1.277 
16783
7 
12.10
7 1.29 
2836
2 12.108 1.262 
18852
4 
12.11
1 1.226 49049 12.106 1.277 167837 
gender .243 .429 49049 .273 .446 167837 .27 .444 
2836
2 .266 .442 
18852
4 .243 .429 49049 .273 .446 167837 
age 36.903 8.863 49049 35.473 8.276 
16783
7 
37.69
8 8.952 
2836
2 35.51 8.315 
18852
4 
36.90
3 8.863 49049 35.473 8.276 167837 
graduation 1.378 .732 49049 .909 .711 167829 1.493 .703 
2836
2 .943 .721 
18851
6 1.378 .732 49049 .909 .711 167829 
married .946 .562 49049 .906 .531 167837 .977 .546 
2836
2 .906 .537 
18852
4 .946 .562 49049 .906 .531 167837 
office type 1.422 .494 49049 5.788 1 
15781
4 1 0 
2836
2 5.349 1.534 
17850
1 1.422 .494 49049 5.788 1 157814 
house loan .304 .46 49049 .373 .484 167837 .304 .46 
2836
2 .366 .482 
18852
4 .304 .46 49049 .373 .484 167837 
work year 1.734 1.205 49049 1.598 .946 
16761
7 1.792 1.244 
2836
2 1.604 .97 
18830
4 1.734 1.205 49049 1.598 .946 167617 
salary 2.775 .824 49049 3.601 1.263 
16782
9 2.681 .782 
2836
2 3.524 1.245 
18851
6 2.775 .824 49049 3.601 1.263 167829 
mkt index 8.286 1.853 49010 8.759 1.696 
16725
9 8.143 1.782 
2834
4 8.729 1.725 
18792
5 8.286 1.853 49010 8.759 1.696 167259 
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Table 2 Test common trend prior to policy intervention 
The table reports common trend before the 2012 Eight Point Policy restriction policy shock. Column 1 and 2 
show the common trend assumption of DD estimation for P2P household who works at Non-government 
agencies and government agencies, as well as Non-SOEs and SOEs, respectively. Non_Gov dummy is one if a 
borrower works for government agencies and zero otherwise. Non_SOE is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 
one if a borrower works for state-owned companies and zero otherwise. A full set of household characteristics 
(age office_type age gender salary graduation) and city fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. 
Standard errors are clustered at city level. The definition of variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * 
stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 
Non_Gov Non_SOE 
VARIABLES interest_rate interest_rate 
      
Non_Gov×2012 July 0.181 
 
 
(0.29) 
 
Non_Gov ×2012 August -0.768 
 
 
(-0.73) 
 
Non_Gov ×2012 September -0.010 
 
 
(-0.02) 
 
Non_Gov ×2012 October -0.675 
 
 
(-0.91) 
 
Non_Gov ×2012 November -1.045 
 
 
(-1.37) 
 
Non_Gov ×2012 December 1.147 
 
 
(1.31) 
 
Non_SOE×2012 July 
 
-0.500 
  
(-0.82) 
Non_SOE×2012 August 
 
-0.748 
  
(-0.76) 
Non_SOE×2012 September 
 
0.024 
  
(0.05) 
Non_SOE×2012 October 
 
-0.725 
  
(-1.04) 
Non_SOE×2012 November 
 
-0.838 
  
(-1.32) 
Non_SOE×2012 December 
 
0.690 
  
(0.89) 
Constant 10.328*** 10.494*** 
 
(22.96) (24.86) 
City Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Observations 723 723 
R-squared 0.958 0.958 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
 
 
 31 
 
Table 3. DD estimation results of the effect of the 2012 Eight Point Policy restriction policy on P2P 
household borrowing costs  
The table reports the DD estimation results of the effect of the 2012 Eight Point Policy restriction policy on 
the borrowing costs from P2P household who works at Non-government agencies and government agencies, 
as well as Non-SOEs and SOEs, respectively. Non_Gov dummy is one if a borrower works for government 
agencies and zero otherwise. Non_SOE is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if a borrower works for state-
owned companies and zero otherwise.  post is an indicator equal to 1 when house borrowing is made after the 
policy shock, December 24, 2012, and zero otherwise. A full set of household characteristics (age 
office_type age gender salary graduation), Month*Year, and city fixed effects are controlled in all 
estimations. Standard errors, clustered at city and office_type level, are shown in brackets. The definition of 
variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
  (1) (2) 
 
Non_Gov Non_SOE 
VARIABLES interest_rate interest_rate 
      
post 0.585** 0.599** 
 
(2.60) (2.70) 
Non_Gov×post -0.362*** 
 
 
(-4.28) 
 
Non_SOE×post 
 
-0.409*** 
  
(-7.51) 
Constant 12.987*** 12.986*** 
 
(107.66) (89.50) 
City Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Month×Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Observations 40,215 40,215 
R-squared 0.236 0.237 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 DDD estimation results of the effect of the 2012 Eight Point Policy restriction policy on P2P household borrowing costs based on heterogeneity 
The table reports the DDD estimation the effect of heterogeneity of the household characteristics, financially constrains, and province marketizations on the variation of 
household responses in the P2P lending market. Non_Gov dummy is one if a borrower works for government agencies and zero otherwise. Non_SOE is a dummy variable, which takes 
the value of one if a borrower works for state-owned companies and zero otherwise.  post is an indicator equal to 1 when house borrowing is made after the policy shock, 
December 24, 2012, and zero otherwise. Age is he number of years that a borrower has born. House_loan is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the household has house loan and 0 
otherwise. mkt_index is the province-level Marketization Index produced by the National Economic Research Institute (NERI). A full set of household characteristics (age office_type 
age gender salary graduation), Month*Year, and city fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors, clustered at city and office_type level, are shown in 
brackets. The definition of the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Non_Gov Non_Gov Gov Non_SOE Non_SOE SOE 
VARIABLES interest_rate interest_rate interest_rate interest_rate interest_rate interest_rate 
          
 
  
post -2.148** 0.485 0.294 0.391 -1.508 0.254 
 
(-2.55) (1.68) (0.97) (1.51) (-1.47) (0.77) 
Non_Gov×post 1.949*** 0.651***  
 
 
 
 
(5.84) (11.76)  
 
 
 
mkt_index -0.243*   
 
-0.157 
 
 
(-1.92)   
 
(-1.50) 
 
Non_Gov×mkt_index 0.311***   
 
 
 
 
(10.42)   
 
 
 
post×mkt_index 0.311**   
 
0.241* 
 
 
(3.29)   
 
(2.21) 
 
Non_Gov×post×mkt_index -0.265***   
 
 
 
 
(-6.70)   
 
 
 
Non_SOE×post 
 
  0.780*** 1.252** 
 
  
  (4.96) (3.05) 
 
Non_SOE×mkt_index 
 
  
 
0.235*** 
 
  
  
 
(5.58) 
 
Non_SOE×post×mkt_index 
 
  
 
-0.192*** 
 
  
  
 
(-6.79) 
 
house_loan 
 
-2.094***  -1.772***  
 
  
(-8.42)  (-5.46)  
 
Non_Gov×house_loan 
 
2.903***  
 
 
 
  
(10.56)  
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post×house_loan 
 
2.020***  1.696***  
 
  
(8.19)  (4.85)  
 
Non_Gov×post×house_loan 
 
-2.512***  
 
 
 
  
(-11.15)  
 
 
 
Non_SOE×house_loan 
 
  2.635***  
 
  
  (10.50)  
 
Non_SOE×post×house_loan 
 
  -2.222***  
 
  
  (-9.08)  
 
Gov×post 
 
 -0.855** 
 
 
 
  
 (-2.37) 
 
 
 
age 
 
 -0.005 
 
 
-0.006 
  
 (-1.11) 
 
 (-1.12) 
Gov×age 
 
 -0.028* 
 
 
 
  
 (-2.30) 
 
 
 
post×age 
 
 -0.002 
 
 -0.002 
  
 (-0.37) 
 
 (-0.33) 
Gov×post×age 
 
 0.037** 
 
 
 
  
 (2.84) 
 
 
 
SOE×post 
 
  
 
 
-0.305 
  
  
 
 (-0.50) 
SOE×age 
 
  
 
 
-0.013 
  
  
 
 (-0.78) 
SOE×post×age 
 
  
 
 0.021 
  
  
 
 (1.15) 
Constant 12.607*** 12.068*** 13.239*** 12.087*** 12.616*** 13.258*** 
 
(13.54) (64.95) (54.93) (74.05) (14.83) (45.86) 
City Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month×Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 40,211 40,215 40,215 40,215 40,211 40,215 
R-squared 0.236 0.377 0.234 0.379 0.236 0.235 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 Test common trend prior to policy intervention 
The table reports common trend before the first visit of central inspection team on borrower i’s province. 
Column 1 and 2 show the common trend assumption of DD estimation for P2P household who works at Non-
government agencies and government agencies, as well as Non-SOEs and SOEs, respectively. Non_Gov 
dummy is one if a borrower works for government agencies and zero otherwise. Non_SOE is a dummy variable, which 
takes the value of one if a borrower works for state-owned companies and zero otherwise. A full set of household 
characteristics (age office_type age gender salary graduation) and city fixed effects are controlled in all 
estimations. Standard errors are clustered at city level. The definition of variables refers to Appendix table. 
***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 
Non_Gov Non_SOE 
VARIABLES interest_rate interest_rate 
      
2012 February 0.009 0.139 
 
(0.02) (0.31) 
2013 January -0.178 0.002 
 
(-0.33) (0.01) 
2013 February -0.197 -0.049 
 
(-0.40) (-0.11) 
2013 March -0.179 0.019 
 
(-0.31) (0.04) 
2013 April -0.206 0.087 
 
(-0.37) (0.19) 
Non_Gov×2012 December 0.166 
 
 
(0.30) 
 
Non_ Gov ×2013 January 0.225 
 
 
(0.41) 
 
Non_ Gov ×2013 February 0.090 
 
 
(0.17) 
 
Non_ Gov ×2013 March 0.154 
 
 
(0.26) 
 
Non_ Gov ×2013 April 0.461 
 
 
(0.79) 
 
Non_SOE×2012 December 
 
0.027 
  
(0.06) 
Non_ SOE ×2013 January 
 
0.032 
  
(0.07) 
Non_ SOE ×2013 February 
 
-0.080 
  
(-0.18) 
Non_ SOE ×2013 March 
 
-0.071 
  
(-0.16) 
Non_ SOE ×2013 April 
 
0.157 
  
(0.33) 
Constant 12.970*** 12.972*** 
 
(114.60) (109.07) 
City Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Observations 7,101 7,101 
R-squared 0.338 0.337 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. DD estimation results of the effect of the Central Inspection Team Campaigns (CITC) on P2P 
household borrowing costs 
The table reports the DD estimation results of the effect of the Central Inspection Team Campaigns (CITC) 
on the borrowing costs from P2P household who works at Non-government agencies and government 
agencies, as well as Non-SOEs and SOEs, respectively. treatpost is a dummy variable and equals one when the central 
inspection team visited borrower i’s province at time t and zero otherwise.  Non_Gov dummy is one if a borrower 
works for government agencies and zero otherwise. Non_SOE is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if a 
borrower works for state-owned companies and zero otherwise.A full set of household characteristics (age office_type 
age gender salary graduation), Month*Year, and city fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors, 
clustered at city and office_type level, are shown in brackets.  The definition of variables refers to Appendix 
table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 
Non_Gov Non_SOE 
VARIABLES interest_rate interest_rate 
      
treatpost 0.070*** 0.030 
 
(6.59) (1.53) 
treatpost×Non_Gov -0.120*** 
 
 
(-9.76) 
 
treatpost×Non_SOE 
 
-0.082*** 
  
(-12.31) 
Constant 12.177*** 12.177*** 
 
(686.89) (651.70) 
City Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Month×Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Observations 206,453 206,453 
R-squared 0.452 0.452 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 DDD estimation results of the effect of the Central Inspection Team Campaigns (CITC) on P2P household borrowing costs based on heterogeneity 
The table reports the DDD estimation the effect of heterogeneity of the household characteristics, financially constrains, and province marketizations on the variation of 
household responses in the P2P lending market. treatpost is a dummy variable and equals one when the central inspection team visited borrower i’s province at time t and zero otherwise.  
Non_Gov dummy is one if a borrower works for government agencies and zero otherwise. Non_SOE is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if a borrower works for state-owned 
companies and zero otherwise.  post is an indicator equal to one when house borrowing is made after the policy shock, December 24, 2012, and zero otherwise. Age is he 
number of years that a borrower has born. house_loan is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the household has house loan and 0 otherwise. mkt_index is the province-level Marketization Index 
produced by the National Economic Research Institute (NERI). Salary is a variable indicating a borrower’s monthly income level A full set of household characteristics (age 
office_type age gender salary graduation), Month*Year, and city fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors, clustered at city and office_type level, are 
shown in brackets. The definition of the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Non_Gov Non_Gov Gov Gov Non_SOE Non_SOE SOE SOE 
VARIABLES interest_rate interest_rate interest_rate interest_rate interest_rate interest_rate interest_rate interest_rate 
                  
SOE×age 
      
0.006*** 
 
       
(16.32) 
 
SOE×salary 
       
0.011 
        
(0.43) 
treatpost -0.870*** -0.007 0.362** 0.124 -1.805*** 0.015 -0.000 0.439*** 
 
(-4.55) (-0.08) (2.59) (1.59) (-3.59) (0.20) (-0.00) (4.72) 
treatpost×Non_Gov 1.184*** -0.148 
      
 
(6.63) (-1.76) 
      
house_loan 
 
-0.821*** 
   
-0.628*** 
  
  
(-37.11) 
   
(-3.75) 
  
treatpost×house_loan 
 
0.918*** 
   
0.758*** 
  
  
(34.03) 
   
(5.48) 
  
Non_Gov×house_loan 
 
1.139*** 
      
  
(7.28) 
      
treatpost×Non_Gov×house_loan 
 
-0.611*** 
      
  
(-8.71) 
      
mkt_index -0.070** 
   
0.017 
   
 
(-2.39) 
   
(0.37) 
   
treatpost×mkt_index 0.110*** 
   
0.046 
   
 
(4.65) 
   
(0.79) 
   
Non_Gov×mkt_index 0.137*** 
       
 
(5.85) 
       
treatpost×Non_Gov×mkt_index -0.151*** 
       
 
(-6.40) 
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treatpost×Gov 
  
-0.465** -0.186* 
    
   
(-3.30) (-2.01) 
    
treatpost×salary 
  
-0.110** 
    
-0.128*** 
   
(-3.34) 
    
(-6.02) 
Gov×salary 
  
-0.006 
     
   
(-0.25) 
     
treatpost×Gov×salary 
  
0.128** 
     
   
(3.40) 
     
treatpost×age 
   
-0.005** 
  
-0.001 
 
    
(-2.46) 
  
(-1.06) 
 
Gov×age 
   
0.001 
    
    
(1.04) 
    
treatpost×Gov×age 
   
0.005** 
    
    
(2.98) 
    
treatpost×Non_SOE 
    
1.155** -0.197*** 
  
     
(2.54) (-4.23) 
  
Non_SOE×mkt_index 
    
0.102* 
   
     
(2.11) 
   
treatpost×Non_SOE×mkt_index 
    
-0.116* 
   
     
(-2.36) 
   
Non_SOE×house_loan 
     
0.994*** 
  
      
(4.87) 
  
treatpost×Non_SOE×house_loan 
     
-0.434** 
  
      
(-2.69) 
  
treatpost×SOE 
      
-0.045** -0.623*** 
       
(-2.75) (-5.55) 
treatpost×SOE×age 
      
0.003*** 
 
       
(7.71) 
 
treatpost×SOE×salary 
       
0.164*** 
        
(4.50) 
Constant 11.752*** 12.059*** 12.122*** 12.131*** 12.384*** 12.053*** 12.127*** 12.116*** 
 
(27.47) (190.14) (518.01) (374.44) (25.21) (210.23) (664.70) (489.92) 
         
Observations 206,449 206,453 206,453 206,453 206,449 206,453 206,453 206,453 
R-squared 0.453 0.494 0.537 0.534 0.293 0.497 0.453 0.539 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. DD and DDD estimation results of the effect of the Announcement of Anti-corruption Rules for 
Military-related personnel on P2P household borrowing costs  
The table reports the DD and DDD estimation results of the effect of the Announcement of Anti-corruption Rules 
for Military-related personnel on the borrowing costs from P2P household who works at Non-military government 
agencies and SOEs, as well military sectors. Non_army is an indicator variable with one working for non-military 
government agencies and SOEs while zero is the household who works in military sectors. post is an indicator 
equals to one when house borrowing is made after the announcement of the military anti-corruption campaign on 
January 18, 2015, and zero otherwise. A full set of household characteristics (age office_type age gender salary 
graduation), Month*Year, and city fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors, clustered at city 
and office_type level, are shown in brackets.  post is an indicator equals to one when house borrowing is made after 
the announcement of the military anti-corruption campaign on January 18, 2015, and zero otherwise. treat is an 
indicator equals to one when household works at Non-military government agencies and SOEs while zero when 
household serves at military. riskness is an indicator variable set to one if the borrowing purpose indicated by an 
individual is for investment; zero otherwise. The definition of variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand 
for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Non_army Non_army Non_army 
VARIABLES interest_rate interest_rate interest_rate 
        
Non_army 0.054*** 
 
0.054*** 
 
(3.70) 
 
(3.61) 
post 0.070** 0.017 0.067** 
 
(2.44) (0.06) (2.29) 
Non_army×post -0.065*** -0.400** -0.061** 
 
(-2.64) (-13.89) (-2.45) 
riskiness 
  
-0.007 
   
(-0.08) 
Non_army×riskiness 
  
-0.010 
   
(-0.11) 
post×riskiness 
  
0.195* 
   
(1.75) 
Non_army2×post×riskiness 
  
-0.223* 
   
(-1.80) 
Constant 11.928*** 12.324*** 11.928*** 
 
(679.98) (105.04) (651.78) 
City Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Month×Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 47,742 2,851 47,742 
R-squared 0.774 0.747 0.774 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9. Robustness check on the effect of the three anticorruption campaigns on P2P household 
borrowing costs 
The table reports the DD estimation results of the effect of the three anticorruption campaigns on P2P household 
borrowing costs. treatpost is a dummy variable and equals one when the central inspection team visited borrower i’s 
province at time t and zero otherwise. post1 is an indicator equal to 1 when house borrowing is made after the policy 
shock, December 24, 2012, and zero otherwise.  post3 is an indicator equals to one when house borrowing is made 
after the announcement of the military anti-corruption campaign on January 18, 2015, and zero otherwise. Non_Gov dummy 
is one if a borrower works for government agencies and zero otherwise. Non_SOE is a dummy variable, which takes the 
value of one if a borrower works for state-owned companies and zero otherwise. Non_army is an indicator variable with 
one working for non-military government agencies and SOEs while zero is the household who works in military sectors. 
Borrowers(user_id) and month*year fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors, clustered at 
borrowers(user_id) and office_type level, are shown in brackets.  The definition of variables refers to Appendix table. 
***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Non_Gov 
(Eight-Point) 
Non_SOE 
(Eight-Point) 
Non_Gov 
(CITIC) 
Non_SOE 
(CITIC) Non_Army 
VARIABLES interest_rate interest_rate interest_rate interest_rate interest_rate 
            
post1 0.523* 0.275 
   
 
(2.35) (0.92) 
   
Non_Gov×post1 -0.641*** 
    
 
(-27.31) 
    
post1×Non_SOE 
 
-0.506** 
   
  
(-2.51) 
   
treatpost 
  
0.026 0.025 
 
   
(0.36) (0.38) 
 
treatpost×Non_Gov 
  
-0.085* 
  
   
(-1.98) 
  
treatpost×Non_SOE 
   
-0.090* 
 
    
(-2.17) 
 
post 
    
0.017 
     
(0.06) 
Non_army×post3 
    
-0.400** 
     
(-13.89) 
Constant 12.916*** 13.714*** 12.369*** 12.368*** 12.324*** 
 
(183.86) (172.67) (458.11) (454.41) (105.04) 
Month×Year Fixed 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
User ID Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,521 6,521 16,726 16,726 2,851 
R-squared 0.848 0.728 0.822 0.822 0.747 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix I Details of Variables Description 
Variable 
Name 
Descriptions Data 
Source 
Interest Rate The percentage of interest rate charged to a borrower  
Loan Amount The amount of money a borrower posts a listing   
Funding 
Probability 
An indicator variable set to one if the loan request of a 
borrower succeeds; zero otherwise 
 
Gender A dummy variable set to one if the borrower is a female, zero 
otherwise 
 
Age The number of years that a borrower has born  
Marriage Series of dummy variables indicating the marital status of the 
borrowers, where n=0 (if the borrower is unmarried), 1 (if the 
borrower is married), 2 (if the borrower is divorced),3 (If the 
borrower is widowed). 
 
Salary Series of dummy variables indicating the borrower’s monthly 
income level, where n=0 (less than1000 RMB, the baseline and 
not included in the regressions), 1(monthly income is between 
1000-2000 RMB), 2(monthly income is between 2000-5000 
RMB); 3 (monthly income is between 5000-10000RMB); 4 
(monthly income is between 10000-20000RMB); 5(monthly 
income is between 20000-50000 RMB); 6 (monthly income is 
above 50000 RMB 
 
Graduation Series of dummy variables indicating the education level of 
borrowers, where n=0 (if the borrower is high school and 
below), 1 (if the borrower is with college degree), 2 (if the 
borrower is with university degree), 3(if the borrower is with 
postgraduate degree and above). 
 
Work years Series of dummy variables showing the working experience of 
borrowers, where n=0 (if the working experience is less than 1 
year), 1(if the working experience is 1-3 years), 2 (if the 
working experience is 3-5 years), 3 (if the working experience 
is more than 5 years. 
 
Office Type A series of dummy variables showing the office type: 0 if the 
office belongs to self-employer(个体经营者); 1 (if the office 
belongs to government agency); 2 (if the office belongs to state-
owned enterprises companies including subordinate 
departments); 3 (if the office belongs to Fortune Global 500 
companies, including joint ventures and subsidiaries); 4 (if the 
office belongs to general listed companies with foreign listed 
companies); 5 (if the office belongs to private companies); 6 (if 
the office belongs to foreign companies including joint 
ventures); 7 (if the office belongs to public institution); 8 (if the 
office belongs to enterprises directly under the local state-
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owned assets supervision and administration commission(地方
国资委直属企业)) 
 
 
House Loan Indicator variable set to one if the borrower has house loans; 0 
otherwise 
 
Non_Gov Indicator variable with one working for non-government 
agencies and zero otherwise. 
 
Non_SOE Indicator variable with one working for non-state-owned 
companies, and zero otherwise. 
 
Gov Indicator variable set to one if the company for the government 
and 0 otherwise 
 
SOE Indicator variable set to one if the company for which a 
borrower working for the company ultimately controlled by the 
state, and 0 otherwise 
 
Non-Army Indicator variable with one working for non-military 
government agencies and SOEs while zero is the household 
who works in military sectors. 
 
Riskiness Indicator variable set to one if the borrowing purpose indicated 
by an individual is for investment; zero otherwise. 
 
Marketization 
Index 
A summary index measuring progress in implementing market 
reforms for each of China’ province-level jurisdictions (32 
provinces, province-level cities, and autonomous regions). 
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Appendix II Details of the Eight-Point Policy  
1. Leaders must maintain close relationship with the public. They ought to 
understand real situations facing by the society through in-depth visits at 
grassroots level. Inspection visits must be carried out more thoroughly but 
with no mere formality. Leaders should listen to the public and talk with 
lower level cadres. Attentions must be drawn to the places where difficulties 
and contradictions are concentrated, and where public opinion is abundant. 
No welcome banner, red carpet, floral arrangement or grand receptions are 
allowed for these officials’ visits. 
2. Meetings and major events should be strictly regulated, with efficiency 
improving. Politburo members are not allowed to attend ribbon-cutting or 
cornerstone-laying ceremonies, or celebrations and seminars, unless they get 
approval from the Central Committee. Official meetings should be 
shortened, be specific and to-the-point, and no empty-talk or blather. 
3. Issuance of official documents should be reduced, especially for unnecessary 
or optional ones. 
4. Officials' visits to foreign countries should only be arranged when necessary, 
with the number of entourage restricted; Chinese expatriates, institutions or 
students will not be organized for a reception at the airport under most 
circumstances. 
5. The work of security guards relating to leaders should be improved. For 
instances, in order to avoid unnecessary inconvenience to the public, fewer 
traffic controls should be implemented when leaders travel. 
6. The number and length of reports are suggested to be curtailed based on the 
actual needs or value of the news. 
7. Leaders should not publish works by themselves or issue any congratulatory 
letters under their name unless authorized by the Central authorities. Official 
documents or publications without meaningful content or of no importance 
should be withheld. 
8. Government officials must strictly abide by the relevant regulations, practice 
a more thrift lifestyle and follow the rules regarding accommodations and 
cars. 
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Appendix III Inspection Scheme of CITIC Provinces  
 
Round 
of CITC 
Province Names No. of 
Provinces 
Announcement Date 
1st Jiangxi, Hubei, Inner Mongolia, 
Guizhou, Chongqing 
5 May 17, 2013 
2nd Anhui, Hunan, Jilin, Yunnan, 
Shanxi, Guangdong 
6 October 23, 2013 
3rd Xinjiang, Liaoning, Beijing, Ningxia, 
Shandong, Tianjin, Henan, Gansu, 
Hainan, Fujian 
10 March 15, 2014 
4th Guangxi, Shanghai, Qinghai, Tibet, 
Zhejiang, Hebei, Shanxi, 
Heilongjiang, Sichuan, Jiangsu 
10 July 15, 2014 
 
 
 
 
